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The Case of  the Budapest Flour Mills*
The history of  the big Budapest flour mills reached its finale in the second half  of  the 
1920s. By then, it had been clear to all players that the Hungarian flour mill industry 
could not return to the prosperity of  the nineteenth century and indeed had become 
one of  the many crisis branches of  the Trianon economy. The grave problems of  the 
branch were not without antecedents. The big mills in Hungary had begun to lose 
ground in the global market in the last decades of  the nineteenth century. Their declining 
competitiveness manifested itself  in reduced exports, drops in price, and increasing 
domestic rivalry. The big Hungarian commercial mills sought solutions to overcome 
their problems that were similar to the solutions adopted by other foreign companies 
at the time. They strove to cut production costs and increase profits by establishing 
economies of  scale and scope with horizontal and vertical integrations. Companies 
used basically two means to limit competition between firms: they organized cartels or 
they merged with their rivals to control their economic environment. In this article, I 
analyze how these crisis management practices were applied to meet corporate needs in 
the interwar period. I investigate these questions mainly as a case study of  the biggest 
Hungarian flour milling company, the Első Budapesti Gőzmalom Rt. (First Budapest 
Steam Mill Co. later: FBSM), based on its archival documents and articles that were 
printed in the contemporary economic press.
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“Only the concentration of  forces can alleviate 
the unfavorable conjuncture of  the firms nowadays”1
The Budapest Steam Mills before World War I
The first phases of  the history of  the big metropolitan mills are quite well known. 
Many publications analyze the factors that explained the unparalleled successes 
thanks to which Budapest became the world’s biggest flour milling center in 
the 1860s and 1870s. The companies, however, proved unable to preserve their 
*  The article was prepared with the support of  the MTA−ELTE Crises History Research Group. 
1  “Elvileg létrejött a vidéki malomkoncentráció,” Pesti Tőzsde, May 13, 1926, 19.
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technological advantages and their positions as leaders in the market permanently. 
From the 1880s on, Hungarian flour exports were gradually forced out of  the 
international markets. Innovative Hungarian grinding methods gained ground 
in other countries, and this also made it difficult for the Hungarian companies 
to maintain a competitive edge. Cheap flour arrived from overseas producers 
and former importers began to make flour using North American, Russian and 
Argentinean wheat, which from the perspective of  quality was in no way inferior 
to the Hungarian products. The competitiveness of  the Budapest firms gradually 
diminished. They were unable to compete with lower priced milling products 
of  the overseas big firms.2 This was due in part to the fact that the Hungarian 
companies were much less productive than their American counterparts. In 
the US roller milling was associated with lower labor requirements. According 
to Perren, in 1890 in Minneapolis one worker produced 562.5 tons of  flour, 
whereas in Budapest production was only 136.1 tons per worker.3 Hungarian 
statistics show similar data. Thus, thanks to highly mechanized plants and better 
organization, the efficiency of  production in the US was roughly four times 
higher than in factories in Hungary. Labor productivity did not improve in the 
later decades either, lagging far behind the values typical in America (Table 1). 
Volume of  
manufactured flour 
(1000 tons)
Total employees 
(persons)
Total workers 
(persons) T1 T2
1890 459.3 3420 3048 134.3 150.69
1900 578 3694 3248 156.47 177.96
1910 609.4 4144 – 147.06 –
Table 1: The Productivity of  the Budapest Milling Industry (1890−1910)
T1: Production per person, tons 
T2: Production per worker, tons
Source: 
Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Új Folyam I. (Budapest: Magyar. Királyi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1893), 149. Accessed 
September 1, 2015, http://konyvtar.ksh.hu/inc/kb_statisztika/statevkonyvek/1893/htm/149.htm.
Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Új Folyam VIII. (Budapest: Magyar. Királyi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1900), 178. 
Accessed September 1, 2015, http://konyvtar.ksh.hu/inc/kb_statisztika/statevkonyvek/1900/htm/178.
htm.
2  Judit Klement, Hazai vállalkozók a hőskorban. A budapesti gőzmalomipar vállalkozói a 19. század második 
felében (Budapest: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2012), 20−34; Judit Klement, Gőzmalmok a Duna partján (Budapest: 
Holnap Kiadó, 2010), 45−47.
3  Richard Perren, “Structural Change and Market Growth in the Food Industry: Flour Milling in Britain, 
Europe, and America, 1850–1914,” Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 43, no. 3 (1990): 427−28.
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Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Új Folyam XVIII. (Budapest: Magyar. Királyi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1910), 186. Accessed 
September 1, 2015, http://konyvtar.ksh.hu/inc/kb_statisztika/statevkonyvek/1910/htm/186.htm.
“A magyar korona országainak 1900. évi népszámlálása. Második rész, A népesség foglalkozása 
községenként,” Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények, Új sorozat, part 2 (Budapest: Magyar. Királyi Statisztikai 
Hivatal, 1904), 82–83, 580–81.
“A magyar szent korona országainak 1910. évi népszámlálása. Harmadik rész, A népesség foglalkozása 
részletesen és a vállalati statisztika,” Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények, Új sorozat, vol. 52 (Budapest: Magyar 
Királyi Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 1914), 396–97. Accessed September 1, 2015, http://konyvtar.ksh.hu/
inc/kb_statisztika/Manda/MSK/MSK_048.pdf.
We know from the research done by Judit Klement and György Kövér that 
the domestic flour industry gradually lost its former leading role in Hungarian 
industry and its profitability declined as of  the middle of  the 1880s. Business 
conditions did not improve in the early twentieth century either. In the years 
leading up to World War I, price competition grew increasingly intense, as did 
the struggle for markets. 4 
From Crisis to Crisis – the Interwar Years
The devastations of  war, a controlled war economy, and the Romanian 
occupation of  much of  Hungary in 1919 caused serious damage to the domestic 
mills.5 However, the provisions of  the Trianon Treaty and the dismemberment 
of  the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy constituted an almost irreparable blow. 
The liquidation of  a stable common internal market encompassing 51 million 
consumers placed Hungarian flour exporters, who had sold the majority of  their 
products in the western parts of  the Monarchy before 1914, in a very difficult 
situation. After the war, production capacities proved oversized compared to 
the volume of  domestic cereal production and lower internal demand, which 
increased production costs significantly. Austria and Czechoslovakia built their 
own milling industries, defended by customs walls, and they increasingly bought 
4  Klement, Hazai vállalkozók a hőskorban, 40−55; Idem, “Die Agrarkrise am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts 
und die Budapester Mühlenindustrie,“ in Krisen/Geschichten im Mitteleuropäischem Kontext. Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Studien zum 19./20. Jahrhundert, ed. Márkus Keller, György Kövér, and Csaba Sasfi 
(Vienna: Institut für Ungarische Geschichtsforschung in Wien, 2015), 167–97; György Kövér, “A budapesti 
malomipar felemelkedése – a központi bank információi tükrében,” in idem, A felhalmozás íve. Társadalom- és 
gazdaságtörténeti tanulmányok (Budapest: Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 2002), 298−308.
5  On the damages to the FBSM during the Romanian occupation: Budapest Főváros Levéltára (=BFL) 
First Budapest Steam Mill Co. XI.1005. box 5, 1918–19, January 21, 1921.
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wheat instead of  flour in Hungary. Therefore, Hungarian flour gradually lost its 
traditional markets in the interwar period (Diagram 1).6
Diagram 1: Wheat flour and grits export of  Hungary, 1925−1937 (1000 quintal)
Source: Hungarian Statistical Yearbooks, relevant years
The greatest stock market crisis of  the stabilization period was caused by the 
failure of  the Victoria Mill, which had been one of  the most successful and 
largest metropolitan flour mills. In two months, shares in the company lost nearly 
90 percent of  their value. In December 1925, they were listed at 400 pengő, 
while in the end of  January 1926 they were worth only 57 pengő. In the last week 
of  January, the depreciation of  the stock caused 16.8 million pengő in losses 
to the owners. In February 1926, Victoria was followed by the Concordia Mill, 
which belonged to the industrial holding of  the prosperous Hatvany-Deutsch 
family. Both general managers, Emil Bacher and Henrik Hönich, committed 
suicide after the critical situation of  their companies had been unveiled. The 
collapse of  the large steam mills was caused by foreign indebtedness, failed 
large-scale futures transactions on the Chicago produce exchange, and the lack 
of  export opportunities. While in Vienna the banks fell prey to the termination 
of  the inflationary boom following financial stabilization, in Pest it was the 
flour mills that crumbled. The crisis proved enduring. Share prices in the milling 
6  On the situation of  the Budapest mills and exports difficulties: Budapesti Kereskedelmi és Iparkamara éves 
jelentései, years 1925−1932; Ernő Szűcs, “A debreceni István Gőzmalom története 1848−1944,” A Hajdú-
Bihar Megyei Levéltár Közleményei 12 (1978): 76−77.
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industry did not recover even in the following years, and they showed the worst 
performance among all securities in the interwar period, according to Katalin 
Mérő’s calculations.7
These grave problems have generally been explained in the secondary 
literature as consequences, in large part, of  changes in the foreign markets, the 
agricultural crisis of  the late nineteenth century, the territorial provisions of  
the Trianon Peace Treaty, and the growing commercial protectionism of  the 
interwar period. However, the question of  how these companies reacted to the 
changes in their economic environment has not been given similar attention. 
The Hungarian flour mills were not simple sufferers of  these shifts in the global 
markets. They had chances to develop various strategies in order to overcome 
the difficulties and improve their competitive positions. I analyze the alternatives 
that were at the disposal of  the Hungarian flour milling industry and the ways in 
which various alternatives were applied.
The Emergence of  Big Business in the Late Nineteenth Century
The second half  of  the nineteenth century witnessed a business revolution, in 
which an ever-widening range of  manufacturing, mining and service companies 
adopted modern forms of  large-scale business. Global big enterprise emerged 
first in the United States and then spread to other continents. A growing 
proportion of  economic transactions took place within the framework of  these 
organizations. Technological factors prompted vertical integration and the growth 
of  the firms on ways that improved processes allowing for increasing economies 
of  scale. The applied new high-volume technologies resulted in unprecedented 
cost advantages when economies of  scale and scope were sufficiently exploited. 
Cost advantages, however, were not automatic. The changes demanded not only 
huge investments in machinery, management and marketing, but also a careful 
rearrangement of  successive processing stages, thorough planning to achieve 
smooth material flows and speedier throughput. Only obsessive cost control and 
monitoring of  the complex production processes resulted in economies of  scale 
and scope and reduced transaction costs. Only in this case could entrepreneurs 
exploit the potentials of  large-scale business to drive out smaller competitors. 
Otherwise, production costs radically increased, and huge losses appeared due to 
7  Ágnes Pogány, “A Pesti Victoria Gőzmalom összeomlása,” Korall, Társadalomtörténeti folyóirat, 14 (2003): 
98–116; (K.) “A Concordia-malom titka,” Pesti Tőzsde, April 1, 1926; Katalin Mérő, “Részvényárfolyamok 
alakulása a budapesti értéktőzsdén, 1864−1943,” Statisztikai Szemle 65, no. 12 (1987): 1258.
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high fixed capital costs compared to labor costs. Corporations typically increased 
their scales by vertical or horizontal integration, mergers and acquisitions. 
According to Chandler, investments in domestic and international marketing 
and distribution were perhaps the most important elements in establishing these 
big industrial firms, because they ensured that the volume of  sales keep pace 
with the new volume of  production.8
In some branches, such as oil refining, metallurgy, or food processing, 
continuous flow techniques and economies of  speed were more easily obtained. 
Modern flour milling technology was especially well-suited for reorganization in 
this new corporate framework. It was no coincidence that large-scale industrial 
enterprises emerged relatively early in this branch of  industry. Hungarian 
investors recognized these huge potentials when they established new, high-
volume grinding capacities to produce homogenous, standardized output in the 
1870s. However, Hungarian entrepreneurs did not imitate wholly the American 
or German big corporations. The Budapest flour mills had many unique features. 
They were smaller in size and horizontal and vertical integration and product 
diversification were not typical at the time.  
The American model involved the mass marketing of  mass produced 
articles in part through the establishment of  sales and marketing departments 
within a company and frequently the development of  a retail sales network. 
Huge advertising campaigns ensured the massive growth of  sales volume. In 
Hungary, on the other hand, the typical practice was to use wholesaler grain-
merchant firms and commercial agents for the purchase of  raw materials and 
the sale of  the produce, because firms could rely on well-established commercial 
services that had functioned well already before the creation of  big industrial 
corporations. Therefore, Hungarian mills did not invest in the creation of  their 
own marketing facilities, and they were possibly less ready to seek out new 
markets for their flours or promote the retail−trade of  their products than their 
North American rivals. According to Judit Klement, Hungarian roller mills had 
extended networks of  flour agents, and they employed brokers and consignees. 
They might have had some marketing campaigns abroad as well, based on 
surviving foreign-language posters and advertising leaflets.9 Big American flour 
mills, on the other hand, increased sales by diversification and the development 
8  Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of  Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge–London: The 
Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press, 1996), 8−9, 21−34; C. J. Schmitz, The Growth of  Big Business in 
the United States and Western Europe, 1850–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5−9.
9  Klement, Gőzmalmok a Duna partján, 71.
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of  many new products, such as breakfast cereals and other products in the 
1920s and 1930s, which were intended for consumers with higher incomes who 
were more open to ready-to-eat foods than Hungarian consumers. In the US 
flour mills developed their own brands in the late nineteenth century. Product 
diversification in Hungary remained modest. Some enterprises built biscuit or 
horse fodder plants. Others started to bake bread during World War I in order to 
increase their profits. The FBSM started to make crackers, and other flour mills 
began to clean rice and barley, or established malt-kilns in the grave crisis at the 
end of  the 1920s.10
Big American flour milling companies followed the path that Chandler 
had described. General Mills was established in 1928, following the merger of  
five flour mills in order to take advantage of  economies of  scale and scope in 
both production and distribution. After the merger, General Mills became one 
of  the largest milling companies in the world. In the 1930s, the firm acquired 
several grocery companies using similar marketing facilities, and it expanded 
its animal-feed lines, all of  which used similar production facilities. In the early 
1900s, the Washburn Crosby Company, which later initiated the merger, spent 
the astronomical amount of  $650,000 on advertising its branded flour product. 
In the early 1920s, the company already had its own advertising department 
and radio station, which broadcasted radio serials like the Betty Crocker Cooking 
School of  the Air, which debuted in 1924 as a means of  advertising their various 
products. By World War II, General Mills had begun to produce toasters and 
other appliances, which it sold through the outlets that handled its groceries.11 
This kind of  business policy was also followed by many roller mills 
in Canada. The W. W. Ogilvie Milling Company increased its size by vertical 
integration and built modern mills with big production capacities. It constructed 
its own line of  elevators through districts that produced the best milling grades 
of  grain. In 1890, the capacity of  the Winnipeg mill was 1,800 barrels (bbls) per 
day,12 and in 1900 it was 2,500 bbls, but in 1909 the Ogilvies’ largest (“Royal”) 
mill in Montreal produced 6,000 barrels (533.4 tons) per day. In the same year, 
Ogilvie Milling built the “biggest mill in the British Empire” and “probably the 
10  József  Szterényi and Jenő Ladányi, A magyar ipar a világháborúban (Budapest: Franklin társulat, 1933): 
266; “A pesti nagymalmok leépítik a gabonaőrlést,” Pesti Tőzsde, February 15, 1928. 
11  Chandler, Scale and Scope, 165; History book of  the General Mills Company, accessed September 19, 
2015, https://www.generalmills.com/en/Company/history.
12  1 barrel wheat flour is 88.9kg, accessed September 1, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barrel 
(unit). 
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biggest in the world” at its Point Douglas (Winnipeg) site, increasing production 
from 4,000 to 8,000 barrels (711.2 tons) per day. For the sake of  comparison, in 
1909 all plants of  the FBSM, which had the biggest production capacity of  the 
Hungarian mills, produced only 220.3 tons of  flour together. In the 1920s, the 
Ogilvies, along with the other large milling companies in Canada, expanded into 
baking and other flour-related businesses, as a way of  guaranteeing a market for 
some of  its flour.13
The Great Wave of Mergers in the US
Capital-intensive industries, due to the big fixed capital investments, were 
especially vulnerable to price warfare and competition for markets, because 
they caused declining sales, deteriorating throughput, overcapacity, decreasing 
prices and severe losses. Therefore, these industries usually attempted to stabilize 
their external business environment and strove to control markets, prices and 
competitors. Basically “three strategies were evident: predatory trade practices, 
cartelization, and monopolization.”14 In the 1880s, a great merger wave began 
in the US. A sense of  tremendous opportunities associated with exploiting 
economies of  scale and scope in the American market was probably the most 
important driving force in promoting the merger movement. By the 1890s, the 
pace of  industrial concentration quickened, culminating in a pronounced peak 
between 1895 and 1903, when an average of  300 firms were absorbed each 
year.15 Chandler was of  the opinion that this merger movement was the single 
most important episode in the evolution of  modern industrial enterprise in 
the US from the 1880s to the 1940s. Not only did it set in place the structure 
of  the new, capital-intensive industries and define their major players for much 
of  the rest of  the twentieth century, it also permitted the rationalization of  
American industries in a way that did not begin in Britain or in Germany 
until the 1920s.16 The formation in 1882 of  the Standard Oil Trust, the first 
13  John Everitt and Roberta Kempthorne, “The Flour Milling Industry in Manitoba since 1870,” Manitoba 
History, 26 (1993): accessed August 23, 2015, http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/mb_history/26/flourmilling.
shtml; Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Új Folyam 18 (1910): 186, accessed September 1, 2015, http://konyvtar.
ksh.hu/inc/kb_statisztika/statevkonyvek/1910/htm/186.htm.
14  Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of  Corporate Control (Cambridge–London: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 2, 12–13.
15  John F. Wilson, British Business History, 1720−1994 (Manchester–New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1995), 65.
16  Chandler, Scale and Scope, 79−80.
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consolidation of  forty smaller and bigger petroleum companies into a single 
giant firm, stimulated many imitations in other industries with the incentives 
to gain effective control of  output, price and market.17 Among turn-of-the-
century mergers, the predominant process was horizontal consolidation, the 
simultaneous merger of  many or all competitors in an industry into a single, 
giant enterprise. 
The simultaneous rapid expansion of  many capital-intensive industries in 
the early 1890s, followed by the deep depression of  1893, gave rise to abnormally 
serious price wars. Lamoreaux explains the 1895–1904 merger wave in the 
United States primarily as an attempt to escape the severe price competition 
that developed during the depression of  the 1890s by firms in capital-intensive, 
mass-production industries, which had expanded rapidly and therefore increased 
their debt burden on the eve of  the 1893 panic. The merger movement came 
partly because of  continuing antirust legislation and activities by the states and 
partly because of  the increasing difficulties of  enforcing contractual agreements 
by trade associations during the depression of  the mid-1890s.18 
Similar processes took place in Great Britain and Germany. From the 
1890s until the late 1920s, large oligopolies came into existence by means of  
horizontal and vertical integrations to exploit economies of  scale and scope. 
In Germany, cartelization did, however, inhibit horizontal merger activity as 
a means of  concentrating production, largely because the security afforded 
by cartels provided little incentive to acquire competitors. On the other hand, 
mergers associated with vertical integration and diversifications were common. 
By 1907, only 5 of  the 100 leading German industrial corporations remained 
undiversified, while 88 had indulged in some form of  vertical integration 
(forward into sales and distribution, or backward into securing supplies of  
raw materials). Merger activity had contributed significantly to fashioning this 
integrated structure.19 
17  David S. Landes, “A Rockefellerek – Szerencse, erényesség és vallásosság,” in idem, Dinasztiák, családi 
vagyonok és vagyonos családok (Budapest: Partvonal Kiadó, 2007), 245−75.
18  Naomi R. Lamoreaux,  The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Chandler, Scale and Scope, 75, 79−80; Schmitz, The Growth of  Big Business, 
59−60.
19  Wilson, British Business History, 72−73; Schmitz, The Growth of  Big Business, 59−60; Ulrich Wengenroth, 
“Germany: Competition Abroad – Cooperation at Home, 1870−1990,” in Big Business and the Wealth of  
Nations, ed. Alfred D. Chandler Jr. et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 139−75; 152−53.
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Crisis Management Strategies of  the Hungarian Flour Milling Industry 
What follows from all this for the big Budapest steam mills? My argument is that 
they faced difficulties similar to those faced by large corporations abroad at the 
turn of  the century. The pioneering entrepreneurs made investments in facilities 
and personnel that were large enough to drive out the smaller, higher-cost firms, 
but with increasing overseas competition Hungarian flour mills became plagued 
by overcapacity, declining throughput, and rising costs as a consequence. 
Increasing output and capacity only intensified competition and drove down 
prices even more. On both continents the standard response by manufacturers to 
intensified competition and the resulting price decline was first to reach informal 
agreements as to price and output and then to make more formal agreements 
(enforced by cartels or trade associations) to reduce output, set prices and 
allocate regional markets. When all of  these strategies proved unsuccessful, then 
they often resorted to mergers.20 Similarly, in Hungary, flour mills developed 
various concepts to solve the crisis and restore market dominance in the middle 
of  the 1920s. In the following, I analyze these crisis-management attempts in the 
case of  the First Budapest Steam Mill Company (FBSM).        
Cartel or Merger?
Before World War I, several forms of  looser cooperation had emerged among 
the metropolitan commercial flour mills. According to Vilmos Sándor, the first 
agreement on the use of  sacks came into being in November 1869. In the 1870s, 
manufacturers came to an understanding on the conditions of  flour shipment, 
credit granting and the borrowing of  sacks. These agreements proved very short-
lived, however.21 The big Budapest mills concluded an agreement on the purchase 
of  wheat before 1873, and by 1882 they formed a cartel to reduce the volume 
of  output when needed. The cartel was renewed from time to time according 
to Kirsch. In 1887, another agreement was reached on the terms of  flour sale, 
number and quality of  flour types, forms of  packing, and the repurchase of  
sacks.22 Although in 1912, the contemporary economist and social democrat 
20 Chandler, Scale and Scope, 71–72.
21 Vilmos Sándor, “A budapesti nagymalomipar kialakulása (1839–1880),” in Tanulmányok Budapest 
múltjából, vol. 13 (Budapest: BTM, 1959), 383.
22 János Kirsch, “Malomipar,” in A magyar élelmiszeripar története, ed. idem et al. (Budapest: Mezőgazdasági 
Kiadó, 1986), 106.
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Jenő Varga wrote explicitly about a flour milling cartel that had reduced output 
to prevent the fall of  flour prices from time to time,23 Judit Klement denies the 
existence of  a broader milling cartel before 1914. According to her, one can find 
precedents only for occasional cooperation, but not all metropolitan flour mills 
joined these associations. They were not able to reach a permanent agreement 
even on a temporary reduction of  output for a couple of  months in the year.24
World War I had brought about significant changes. The organization of  
a centralized war economy represented a kind of  forced cartelization which 
reduced the autonomy of  the flour milling companies considerably.25 After 
the war, many elements of  the war economy, such as public provision of  flour 
for the public employees or state control of  exports, had remained in effect 
until financial stabilization and the shortage of  wheat and coal made stronger 
cooperation also reasonable. Following the fall of  the Soviet Republic in 1919, 
the metropolitan flour mills concluded an agreement with the government. It 
was decided that, of  the 13 Budapest flour mills, 7 were to be closed down. The 
government was ready to cover the costs not only of  those mills that were kept 
in operation, but also of  those which were shut down, and this was particularly 
favorable for the firms.
This period was the time of  daily lengthy talks with the existing 
government, and it was next to impossible to imagine that it would 
have been possible to protect the common interests without common 
administration.26
In these early post-war years, a so called milling concentration had been formed, 
which was renewed yearly until the summer of  1925. The functioning mills 
operated on a common profit or loss basis, on common account. The millers’ 
fee and the working conditions were set by a contract made between the mills 
and the Futura Trade Corporation of  Hungarian Cooperative Centers (Futura, 
Magyar Szövetkezeti Központok Áruforgalmi Rt.), which was the successor of  the 
war-time economic organization War Produce Co. (Hadi Termény Rt.). The flour 
23  Jenő Varga, “A magyar kartellek,” in idem, A proletárdiktatúra gazdaságpolitikája. Válogatott írások, 1912–
1922 (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1976), 78. 
24  Klement, Gőzmalmok a Duna partján, 46–47; Judit Klement, “Vállalatok hálózatban, Vállalati kooperáció 
a 20. század elején a budapesti gőzmalomiparban,” Korall 50 (2012): 82−106.
25  Sándor Farkasfalvy, “Malomstatisztika,” Magyar Statisztikai Szemle 4 (1926): 83–88. 
26  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (=MNL OL) Z40 Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank, 
Projektumok, 2009/2. batch 52, item 949. Egyes magyarországi nagyobb malomcsoportok és nagyobb malmok 
egyesüléséről, January 18, 1926; Kirsch, “Malomipar,” 118.
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mills established a common office for the control and settlement of  common 
receipts and expenses, which functioned successfully according to the director of  
the FBSM.27 The many difficulties after the war brought the firms closer to one 
another; the business federations the Hungarian Metropolitan Milling Association 
(Magyar Fővárosi Malomegyesület) and the National Association of  the Provincial 
Milling Industrialists (Vidéki Malomiparosok Országos Egyesülete) therefore formed 
a common steering committee to help foster closer cooperation.28 In the early 
1920s, the managers of  the Budapest mills still looked optimistically to the 
future, and they believed in the return of  the better export opportunities of  the 
prewar years. This optimism did not last long, however. It evaporated soon after 
the end of  the inflationary boom.
Raising the Milling Concentration from the Dead
During the process of  financial stabilization following hyperinflation, the 
government liquidated the last elements of  the war economy; discontinued 
the public provision of  flour, and liberated flour exports. These measures 
terminated the principal reasons to sustain the milling concentration, so it was 
closed on July 15, 1925.29 A ruthless life-or-death war for markets began among 
the corporations as a consequence.30 In spite of  the competitive struggle, many 
milling companies wanted to return to forms of  cooperation. The leadership 
of  the FBSM was also assured that “the concentration was absolutely necessary, 
considering the low utilization of  the grinding capacities.”31 
A draft to revitalize the terminated milling concentration was made by 
the general manager of  the FBSM Sándor Stux who wanted to invite even the 
representatives of  the Austrian and provincial mills to the talks on the new 
cartel. The negotiations had been carried on for several months in early 1925, 
27  BFL XI.1005. box 5, EBG, General Assembly of  the year 1918–1919, January 21, 1921., 7; Kirsch, 
“Malomipar,” 115; BFL XI.1005. box 10, Társulás és üzemösszevonás szüksége a magyar malomiparban 
és annak módozatai.
28  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1918−1919, January 21, 
1921, 7.
29  MNL OL Z40 2009/2. 52. item 949, Egyes magyarországi nagyobb malomcsoportok és nagyobb malmok 
egyesüléséről, January 18, 1926.
30  Henrik Hönich, “A magyar malomipar megmentése,” Pesti Tőzsde, August 20, 1925, 1−2; Ármin Láng, 
“Malomiparunk helyzete,” Pesti Tőzsde, February 21, 1926. 
31  BFL XI.1005. Secretariat, documents, box 2. General Assembly, documents and minutes. General 
Assembly of  the year 1924, May 11, 1925, report of  the board of  directors.
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but they ended with a fiasco.32 The always well-informed economic weekly Pesti 
Tőzsde33 had reason to believe that the milling concentration was prevented by 
Emil Bacher, since he did not want to join the cartel with the provincial flour 
mills of  the Victoria Mill.34 The only matter the Budapest mills were able to 
agree on was the reestablishment of  the milling agreement which had been in 
force before the war. It concerned albeit only questions of  minor importance, 
such as the uniform payment and shipment terms of  flour sales and had started 
from August 1925 on. The provincial firms joined later as well.35
In the springtime of  1926, before the ensuing grinding season, plans 
for the creation of  a milling cartel came up again. This time, the provincial 
mills initiated the negotiations, sending out a special commission to solve the 
problems. Originally, they planned a cartel for the provincial flour mills which 
was to grow to nationwide proportions later on. The government strongly 
supported the agreement; they attributed the collapse of  the Concordia and 
Victoria and the crash of  many smaller flour mills to the absence of  the milling 
cartel in the first place.36 The press reported in May that an agreement among 
the provincial mills had been reached. About twenty to twenty-five country mills 
joined the arrangement, which was developed on the basis of  a proposal made 
by Lipót Schrecker, general manager of  the Borsod-Miskolci Steam Mill, which 
belonged to the Hatvany-Deutsch milling group. The participants agreed on the 
basic principles, but the final compromise was not yet reached. The cartel was to 
assume joint control of  procurement and sales through a central administration. 
The concentration should begin in early July and work on common 
profit. The brand names of  the provincial mills are to remain in use, 
but purchases and sales will be carried out according to the instructions 
of  the central administration.
Unfortunately, not everyone agreed on these terms. Géza Aczél, general manager 
of  the Back Mill which had plants in Győr and Szeged, opposed the Schrecker-
plan. Instead, he proposed an output reduction in the country mills by fixing 
and dividing weekly or monthly quotas. Nevertheless, the majority accepted the 
32  Hönich, “A magyar malomipar megmentése,” 1−2.
33  Pesti Tőzsde (Pest Exchange) was an economic weekly that appeared every Thursday. It was edited by 
János Kallós, who also published the business yearbook Kallós-féle Compass.
34  “A Victoria malomnál minden rendben, de Bacher megosztja hatalmát,” Pesti Tőzsde, January 21, 1926, 
3; (K.) “A Concordia-malom titka,” Pesti Tőzsde, April 1, 1926.
35  “Augusztus 1-től feltámad a malomegyezmény,” Pesti Tőzsde, July 9, 1925, 13.
36  “A kormány sürgeti a malomkoncentrációt,” Pesti Tőzsde, March 4, 1926, 5. 
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first proposal during the negotiations. The organizers of  the cartel did not want 
to omit the major Budapest mills from the agreement, inasmuch as most owned 
significant provincial plants. Pesti Tőzsde was informed that Emil Bacher was 
not hostile to the cartel this time. On the contrary, he wished to join it with his 
flour mills.37 Baron Károly Hatvany and Lipót Schrecker had to convince Sándor 
Stux, the head of  FBSM, the biggest flour mill in Hungary. His words were of  
especially great importance, since in the summer of  1926 he was elected to the 
position of  cochairman of  the Hungarian Metropolitan Milling Association and 
he had become a councilor on the Stock Exchange a few weeks earlier.38 
The Big Mill Merger
Nevertheless, it became clear by the end of  May that FBSM did not support the 
Schrecker-plan and had other ideas concerning inter-firm cooperation instead; 
they planned a much more radical organizational transformation. According to 
the journalist writing in Pesti Tőzsde, the idea of  the big merger appeared as early 
as the last months of  1925. Not only Sándor Stux supported the plan, so did the 
head of  the Concordia Mill, Henrik Hönich. 
[The essence of  the project was] to merge all Budapest and four or 
five leading provincial mills into a single corporation and in doing so 
to create a new joint stock company with huge capital, the shares of  
which would be listed on the stock exchange, and the securities of  all 
participating firms would be exchanged for shares in the new trust 
company.39 
The talks concerning the big merger fell through again because of  the resistance 
of  the provincial mills, and the concept was struck from the agenda after the 
outbreak of  the milling crisis at the turn of  1925−1926.40
Although several plans were drawn up to relieve the grave crisis, it soon 
became obvious that the companies were unable to agree and accept any of  
them, albeit the government pressed vehemently for the bargain, principally with 
regards to exports. The minister of  commerce, Lajos Walko, who had to face an 
increasingly deteriorating balance of  payments after the financial stabilization, 
37  “Elvileg létrejött a vidéki malomkoncentráció,” Pesti Tőzsde, May 13, 1926, 19.
38  “Stux Sándor a Malomegyesület feladatairól és a malomkoncentrációról,” Pesti Tőzsde, July 8, 1926, 5.
39  “Koncentráció vagy tröszt a malomiparban,” Pesti Tőzsde, May 27, 1926, 9.
40  Ibid., 9.
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summoned the heads of  the big Budapest mills to a consultation in the summer 
of  1926.41 At the meeting, Stux also explained that he regarded the cartel plans 
as useless and did not support them because it would have been impossible to 
convince 3,000 flour mills to comply with the rules of  the cartel, but even the 
350 commercial mills would have been too many for a cartel. Administration 
would also have been too expensive.42 His reasoning was hardly a surprise; 
the most recent research had also proved that the majority of  the cartels were 
especially vulnerable and short-lived. It was extremely difficult and costly to 
frame such controlling mechanisms that could force the cartel members to keep 
the agreement, since the temptation to cheat was too great. It seemed profitable 
to offer products below the prices fixed by the cartel or to fail to meet other terms 
of  the agreement.43 Consequently, the FBSM sought a solution in horizontal 
integration, which promised much higher cost savings than a simple cartel. Stux 
was convinced that “only a merger is expedient from the point of  view of  the 
rationalization of  technology and personnel.”44 According to the correspondent 
writing for the Pesti Tőzsde, FBSM wanted to merge with four big flour mills in 
the summer of  1926. The Gizella, the Schmidt and Császár, the Hungária Mills 
and the Borsod−Miskolci concern were considered acceptable partners. Stux 
wanted to exchange the securities of  the merging mills for the shares of  the 
FBSM. Nevertheless, neither his plan nor the cartel plan of  120 provincial mills 
was realized in the end.45 
Contemporary newspapers are not the only sources on the Stux project. He 
himself  put his ideas concerning the big merger down on paper for the FBSM 
and its principal shareholder, the Hungarian Commercial Bank of  Pest (Pesti 
Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank) twice in 1926.46 In these memoranda Stux, stressed that 
41  “Százhúsz malom 10 éves koncentrációra kész,” Pesti Tőzsde, July 1, 1926, 5.
42  BFL XI. 1005. box 10, Társulás és üzemösszevonás szüksége a magyar malomiparban és annak 
módozatai. One can find the same 15 page-long type-written draft among the documents of  the 
Commercial Bank. The author was in all probability Stux: Z40 Projektumok, 52. 949. Proj. 2009/1. Társulás 
és összevonás szüksége a magyar malomiparban és annak módozatai (without date). 
43  Jeffrey Fear, “Cartels,” in The Oxford Handbook of  Business History, ed. Geoffrey Jones et al. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), Oxford Handbooks Online, accessed December 8, 2015, www.
oxfordhandbooks.com. 
44  “Lesz-e fúzió a malomiparban?,” Pesti Tőzsde, December 15, 1927, 7.
45  “Százhúsz malom 10 éves koncentrációra kész,” 5.
46  MNL OL Z40 Projektumok, 52, 949, 2009/1. Társulás és összevonás szüksége a magyar malomiparban 
és annak módozatai. Z40 Projektumok, 2009/2. 52, 949. Egyes magyarországi nagyobb malomcsoportok 
és nagyobb malmok egyesüléséről, 1926. január 18. The author’s name is not mentioned in the texts, but it 
is clear from the contexts that it was Sándor Stux. 
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he did not consider cartel a good solution, and he deemed mergers necessary 
because of  the high production costs. He urged radical cuts in costs and the 
rationalization of  the plants and the staff. His merger plans met with strong 
resistance however; the owners of  the plants sentenced to be shut down insisted 
vehemently on keeping their mills working, although their mills would have 
continued to operate with high production costs and losses. The negotiations 
again failed to produce meaningful results. 
News on the merger appeared again in the press by the end of  1927. 
Pesti Tőzsde wrote about a merger of  FBSM, Borsod−Miskolci Mill, and Első 
Békéscsaba Steam Mill, which belonged to the sphere of  influence of  the 
latter. Stux confirmed that there had been some consultations between himself  
and general manager Schrecker.47 However, again they failed to resolve their 
differences. Borsod−Miskolci did not want to merge its profitable foreign mills. 
FBSM, on the other hand, was not inclined to the merger if  this condition 
was not met.48 Rumors about the establishment of  a “new huge milling trust” 
gained ground in May 1928 once more. This time FBSM, Borsod−Miskolci, 
Gizella and all of  Victoria’s mills in Budapest and the rest of  Hungary were to 
be amalgamated. According to the news, there were intense daily negotiations in 
Stux’s office that had the support of  the government.
The new company is to take over all plants of  the big Budapest mills 
in return for shares, and it will grind only in those mills where it is the 
most rational in order to guarantee the best utilization of  capacities and 
lower flour prices. The absorbed companies would share in the profit 
in form of  dividends. The new corporation would merge the provincial 
plants of  the merged mills as well and thus control a significant part of  
the domestic milling industry.49
However, it became soon obvious that there were serious conflicts among 
the negotiating partners. One of  them was that they were unable to agree on 
questions of  leadership. FBSM reserved the leading role for itself, given that it 
owned more than 50 percent of  the production capacities to be amalgamated. 
The others did not accept this and wanted to participate in the controlling 
positions, claiming that on the basis of  assets their positions were not so ill-
47  “Lesz-e fúzió a malomiparban?,” 7.
48  “Miért hiúsult meg az Első Budapesti Gőzmalom és a Borsod-Miskolci fúziója?.” Pesti Tőzsde, 
December 22, 1927. 
49  “Óriási malomtröszt alakul,” Pesti Tőzsde, May 10, 1928, 7.
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proportioned.50 Personal issues proved to be the final impediment to the merger. 
Of  the four heads of  the milling firms, only one could have become general 
manager of  the new company. In order to further thrift and rationalization, 
the number of  high-ranking employees and other staff  would have had to have 
been decreased by 75 percent at least as well. Another problem arose because 
the Hungária Mill was not inclined to join the talks, although the government 
insisted on this and made its support and the granting of  various privileges 
conditional on the participation of  all big flour mills in the merger.51
Accordingly, the huge milling trust was not created in 1928 either. The 
horizontal integration of  the biggest companies of  the branch failed to come 
about. The press reported on the complete cessation of  negotiations as early 
as November. The big merger lost its actuality and expedience. Agricultural 
producers suffering from the grave consequences of  grain overproduction 
on world markets also vehemently opposed the formation of  a huge milling 
oligopoly, as they were afraid of  a further decline in prices.52 All this meant that 
none of  the projects elaborated in order to reestablish inter firm cooperation was 
realized in the second half  of  the 1920s. The beginning of  the Great Depression 
put an end to autonomous crisis management strategies from the 1930s on. 
Individual Strategies − Building a Concern
Managers of  the flour mill companies were presumably not astonished when 
they faced the difficulties of  making a cartel since they had not managed to set 
up a permanent agreement before World War I either. The repeated failure of  
cooperative strategies therefore made it necessary for individual corporations to 
develop their own crisis management strategies as well in order to improve their 
positions. Consequently, as early as the turn of  the century, the FBSM aimed 
to form its own flour milling group by acquiring several plants. This policy was 
justified in the management’s report of  the year 1903 by the cutthroat war of  
the flour mills and the failure to establish mechanisms for controlling inter-
firm competition. There were no hostile take-overs, however, since the milling 
50  “Nehezen születik meg az új malomholding,” Pesti Tőzsde, May 24, 1928, 6.
51  “Malomholding helyett a régi malomkoncentráció feltámasztásáról tárgyalnak,” Pesti Tőzsde, May 31, 
1928, 6.
52  “Stux Sándor az Első Budapesti Gőzmalom vezérigazgatója a malomipar kilátásairól, a 
malomrészvények árcsökkenéséről, a koncentrációról, amely nem jöhet létre,” Pesti Tőzsde, November 8, 
1928, 5.
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enterprises wanted themselves to join the FBSM, which accepted only the offers 
that were considered the most favorable. First, FBSM made a bargain with the 
shareholders of  two well-reputed and long-standing companies, the Lujza Steam 
Mill (Lujza Gőzmalom) and the Pest Mill of  Millers and Bakers (Pesti Molnárok és 
Sütők Malma) in 1903.53 There was an uncompelled mutual exchange of  shares 
by raising the share capitals of  the participating companies. The management 
expected the deal to lead to an improvement in the company’s competitiveness.54 
FBSM acquired share ownership in the Erzsébet Steam Mill in 1911.55 
The building of  the holding had accelerated during the years of  World War 
I. FBSM obtained shares of  many Budapest and provincial flour mills. It bought 
plants in Karcag, Mezőtúr and Gyoma in 1915 and formed the joint stock 
company Tisza-County Roller Mill and Warehouse Co. (Tiszavidéki Hengermalom 
és Tárház Rt.) out of  them. It also got hold of  other firms in Vác, Zombor, 
Galac and Pancsova.56 In 1916, FBSM concluded an agreement with the owners 
of  the Pest Roller Mill Company (Pesti Hengermalom Társaság) to exchange their 
securities for shares of  the FBSM, four Roller Mill shares being equal to one 
share in First Budapest. Those who did not like the bargain could sell or even 
keep their Roller Mill shares. FBSM financed the extension of  its sphere of  
interest by raising the share capital by one million crown, to 7.5 million crown. 
Thus, the daily grinding capacities of  the whole group had increased to 2,670 
tons.57 In 1916, they acquired the majority ownership of  the Zenta Roller Mill 
(Zentai Hengermalom Heszler és Társai Rt.) and bought a plant in Versec with a daily 
grinding capacity of  40 tons, to be enlarged later on. Out of  the two latter mills 
the Southern Milling Industry Co. (Délvidéki Malomipar Rt.) was established. It 
was a new joint stock company with a 500,000-crown share capital. The business 
report of  1916 explained that the new acquisitions made possible the control 
53  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1903, minutes of  the 
general assembly, February 15, 1904; Klement, “Vállalatok hálózatban,” 91.
54  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1903, minutes of  the 
general assembly, February 15, 1904. 
55  Klement, Gőzmalmok a Duna partján, 123; Klement, “Vállalatok hálózatban,” 87−88. On these 
acquisitions see also the article of  Judit Klement in this issue: Judit Klement, “How to Adapt to a Changing 
Market? The Budapest Flour Mill Companies at the Turn of  the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” 
Hungarian Historical Review 4, no. 4 (2015).
56  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1915.
57  BFL XI.1005. box 5. General Assembly of  the year 1915. I would like to thank Judit Klement for 
having put the minutes concerning the agreement with the Pest Roller Mill Co. at my disposal. See also: 
Klement, “Vállalatok hálózatban,” 98−102; idem, “Apák és fiúk gazdasági stratégiái: egy magyar család a 19. 
és 20. században,” Aetas 1–2 (2005): 69−92. 
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of  the firms that had been bought up.58 In 1917, a new flour mill, the First 
Székesfehérvár Steam Mill Co. (Első Székesfehérvári Gőzmalmi Rt.), was built.59 The 
Károly Mill in Nagykikinda, which was bought up that autumn, was transformed 
into a joint stock company with one million-crown share capital, and its daily 
capacities were enlarged to 60 tons. The Tisza-County Roller Mill and Warehouse 
was completed with a mill in Szarvas and a storehouse in Dévaványa.60 During 
the war years there were many new investments. Capacities were increased in the 
hopes of  a better business atmosphere in the peacetime to come. A completely 
new plant was built on the site of  the Erzsébet Mill, which was burnt down 
in 1914. According to the report of  the management, it was furnished with 
the most up-to-date equipment and became one of  the biggest mills on the 
continent.61 The holding grew much more slowly in the inflationary period. The 
shares of  the József  Lowland Steam Mill and Sawmill Co. (József  Alföldi Gőzmalom 
és Fűrészmalom Rt.) in Hódmezővásárhely and the Körös-County Industrial and 
Trade Company (Körösvidéki Ipari és Áruforgalmi Rt.) were obtained in 1922.62 In 
the following year, Júlia Mill in Nyíregyháza got involved in the business group 
in order to get a satisfactory position in a significant rye-producing province.63
Although FBSM acquired several Budapest and provincial flour mills during 
the first decades of  the twentieth century, these new acquisitions continued to 
operate separately, under their own former names and with their own accounts 
and profits. This meant that no effective merger was undertaken. Only grinding 
capacities were enlarged, but new, more effective organizational solutions to help 
further rationalization and economies of  scale and scope were not implemented. 
An effort to get the biggest output quota in a future milling cartel might explain 
this policy of  acquisitions by the FBSM. It would also add to the picture that 
many mills that joined the concern had belonged to the sphere of  interest of  
the Pest Hungarian Commercial Bank (PMKB) before. The Bank had a majority 
share ownership in several of  these flour mills. The Commercial Bank owned 
58  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1916.
59  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors, the supervisory board and annual accounts of  
the business year 1917, March 27, 1918.
60  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1918−1919, January 21, 
1921. 
61  BFL XI.1005. box 5. Report of  the board of  directors on the business year 1916.
62  BFL XI.1005. box 2. General assembly of  the year 1922, June 18, 1923. Report of  the board of  
directors.
63  BFL XI.1005. box 2. General assembly of  the year 1923, June 23, 1924. Report of  the board of  
directors.
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nearly 100 percent of  the Zombor, Vác, Pancsova and Zenta steam mills already 
in 1913. The Bank owned a significant share of  the First Budapest Steam Mill 
as well. According to the data presented by Béla Tomka, it had nearly 30 percent 
of  the shares in the end of  1913.64 The bank might have obtained an even larger 
parcel of  shares later on based on the number of  securities that were deposited 
at the general assemblies held in the late 1920s and early 1930s  (Table 2). 
1928 1929 1931
Number of  shares deposited by the Hungarian Commercial Bank 
of  Pest 75,000 95,000 65,568
Number of  all deposited shares at the general assembly 85,205 10,4675 116,507
Shares deposited by the Hungarian Commercial Bank, in percent of  
all deposited shares 88.02% 90.76% 56.28%
Total number of  FBSM shares 165,000 165,000 165,000
Shares deposited by the Hungarian Commercial Bank, as a percent 
of  total number of  FBSM shares 45.45% 57.58% 39.74%
Table 2: Shares deposited at the general assembly of  the FBSM, 1928−1931
Source: BFL XI.1005. box 2. General assembly of  1927, February 24, 1928. General assembly of  1928, 
February 14, 1929; Minutes taken at the 63rd ordinary general assembly of  the First Budapest Seam Mill 
Co. on February 21, 1931. 
The Commercial Bank showed great interest in the flour mills. In 1913 the 
biggest part (27.2 percent) of  the bank’s industrial shareholdings belonged to 
the milling industry. Tomka has shown that this was not a result of  a deliberate 
business policy, since the profitability of  the flour milling industry was low by that 
time. Current share prices frequently remained below face value. The purpose of  
industrial shareholdings was often to obtain discount and deposit business, but 
illiquid companies could pay off  their debts with their own shares as well, which 
might have remained in the portfolio of  the creditor for years considering the 
low market value of  these securities. The profitability of  the smaller provincial 
flour mills was particularly low. They were frequently highly indebted with the 
bank; their debts were significantly higher than their share capital (Table 3).65 
64 Béla Tomka, Érdek és érdektelenség. A bank-ipar viszony a századforduló Magyarországán 1892−1913 
(Debrecen: Multiplex Média–Debrecen U. P., 1999), 126–29, 179.
65 Ibid.
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Flour Mills
Share 
holding 
of  the 
bank 
(percent)
Share 
capital 
Credits 
granted by 
the bank 
Syndicate 
quota
Members on board 
of  directors and 
supervisory board 
representing the bank 
(person)(1000 crowns)
First Budapest Steam Mill 29.65 6500 - - 2
Erzsébet Steam Mill 0.7 2700 1870.0 91.3 2
King Mill Hedrich and 
Strausz
33.9 4000 6530.5 - 1
Zombori Roller Mill 97 1000 2897.3 - 2
Vác Roller Mill 95.1 750 1287.2 - 2
Pancsova Steam Mill 100.0 400 1515.2 - 2
Zenta Roller Mill - 600 903.2 - 2
Lujza Steam Mill - 2800 - - 1
István Steam Mill of  
Debrecen
- 5200 - 490.7 -
Gizella Steam Mill - 3200 - - 1
First Békéscsaba Steam Mill - 2000 200.0 - -
Table 3: The flour milling holding of  the Hungarian Commercial Bank of  Pest, 1913.
Source: Tomka, Érdek és érdektelenség, 179.
The Commercial Bank took an active part in building the milling group around 
the First Budapest Steam Mill, mediated the exchange of  shares between the 
Lujza Mill and the FBSM, transformed the King Mill (Királymalom) into a joint 
stock company, and bought up several smaller provincial mills before World War 
I. The aim was probably to increase the efficiency of  the companies. At least, 
calculations made in 1914 suggest this. The bank had estimated the economic 
efficiency of  the big commercial mills in Budapest, taking into account their 
grinding capacities and financial positions, and guessed the effects of  a possible 
merger on their productivity.66 According to the calculation, the profit of  the 
bank’s milling group had only slightly exceeded the discount rate of  the central 
bank (Table 4). According to Tomka, the profitability of  other industries was 
significantly higher. In 1913, profitability in banking was 14.3, and in the iron 
and steel industry it was 18.4 percent (profit as a percentage of  share capital).67
66  Ibid., Béla Tomka, “A magyar malomipar finanszírozása (1895–1913),” Korall 14 (2003): 79–97.
67  Ibid., 94.
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Flour Mill
Average investment 
(1000 crowns)
Profitability (percent)
1912 1913 1912 1913
Pancsova Steam Mill 1378 1457 6.72 7.65
Vác Roller Mill 1291 1250 6.65 7.54
Zombor Roller Mill 2183 2536 6.76 7.74
Zenta Roller Mill 753 765 8.18 8.75
Discount rate of  the Austro-Hungarian Bank - - 5.15 5.9
Table 4: Profitability of  the flour milling holding  
of  the Hungarian Commercial Bank of  Pest, 1912−1913
The data contain the incomes from interests and commissions.
Source: MNL OL Z40 Projektumok, 52. item 984 Malmainknál való kihelyezéseink 1912. és 1913. évi 
jövedelmezősége [Profitability of  our Investments in our Flour Mills in the Years 1912 and 1913]. Budapest, 
January 28, 1914. 
Thus, the new members of  the milling concern of  the FBSM were not very 
lucrative and their financial positions were also not favorable. In spite of  this, 
no direct measures were taken to reduce costs by concentrating grinding in the 
most effective plants or rationalizing production and administration until 1926. 
Managers viewing future business potentials as bright renewed the mills and 
enlarged grinding capacities during the period of  post-war inflation. 68 
Chandler has pointed out that acquisitions alone did not ensure market 
dominance and cost reduction. Mergers increased organizational capabilities 
and productivity only if  a single, centralized administrative control was quickly 
established over the merged or acquired companies and the facilities and 
personnel were then rationalized to exploit more fully the economies of  scale 
and scope. But if  the companies acquired or those coming into the merger 
were not administratively centralized and rationalized but instead continued 
to operate autonomously, much as they had before the change, the enlarged 
enterprise remained little more than a federation of  firms. The resulting cost 
advantages were minimal.69 These conclusions were drawn relatively late in 
Budapest. Only the grave milling crisis in 1925−1926 and the repeated failure of  
collective collusive policies forced the management of  the FBSM to develop a 
new corporate strategy and fundamentally reorganize the company structure. By 
the springtime of  1926, it had been settled that the merger of  the plants acquired 
earlier would be completed.
68  BFL XI.1005. box 5. General assembly of  the year 1918−1919, January 21, 1921.
69  Chandler, Scale and Scope, 37, 71, 78, 229.
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Merger and Rationalization
At the extraordinary general assembly of  the FBSM held on April 22, 1926, the 
merger of  three Budapest (Pest Roller Mill Company, Pest Steam Mill of  Millers 
and Bakers, Erzsébet Steam Mill) and five mills outside the city (Vác Roller 
Mill, First Székesfehérvári Steam Mill, Tisza-County Roller Mill and Warehouse, 
Karcag, József  Lowland Steam Mill and Sawmill, Hódmezővásárhely, Júlia Steam 
Mill, Nyíregyháza) was decided. From then on, the merged mills operated as 
plants of  the First Budapest Steam Mill. The merger took place on the same day 
in the same board room of  the FBSM in the case of  all participating firms. New 
FBSM shares were emitted and exchanged against the securities of  the fused 
companies and then these exchanged shares were destroyed. The majority of  the 
newly issued shares ended up in the portfolio of  the FBSM because it had owned 
the shares of  the merged companies even before the merger (Table 5). The other 
shares to be exchanged were bought from their owners. Two plants were left out 
of  the merger. Lujza Mill continued to function as a separate warehouse and the 
Körös-County Industrial and Trade Co. was maintained as an independent entity 
for various commercial transactions.70
External 
shareholding
Shareholding 
of  the FBSM Total shares
FBSM 
ownership 
(%)pieces
Luiza Steam Mill 49.000 61,201.000 61,250.000 99.920
Pest Mill of  Millers and Bakers 238.040 31,261.960 31,500.000 99.240
Erzsébet Mill 129.330 47,120.670 47,250.000 99.730
Pest Roller Mill 509.864 55,490.136 56,000.000 99.089
Tisza-County Roller Mill and Warehouse Co. 0.000 393,750.000 393,750.000 100.000
Körös-County Industrial and Trade Co. 0.000 210,000.000 210,000.000 100.000
Vác Roller Mill 22,319.000 677,681.000 700,000.000 96.811
József  Lowland Steam Mill and Sawmill Co. 252,100.000 797,900.000 1,050,000.000 75.990
First Székesfehérvár Steam Mill 0.000 1,050,000.000 1,050,000.000 100.000
Júlia Mill 112.000 1319.000 1431.000 92.173
Table 5: The flour milling group of  the First Budapest Steam Mill before the merger of  1926
Source: BFL XI. 1005. Első Budapesti Gőzmalom Részvénytársaság, Okmánytár, Fúziókra vonatkozó 
iratok [FBSM, Record Office, Documents concerning fusions] box 73. 36.
70  BFL XI.1005. Record office, box 73. file 36. Preparatory documents concerning the fusion of  1926. 
BFL XI. 1005. box 2. General assembly of  the year 1925, April 30, 1926.
Crisis Management Strategies after World War I
891
In order to maximize savings, smaller plants which were deemed superfluous 
were closed down following the merger.
We concentrated our plants in such a way that from among our 
Budapest mills only the most economical one on Pozsonyi Street was 
kept continuously in operation. We put in operation our best equipped 
roller mill only in the autumn months when it was most needed.
There were dismissals as well, both of  workers and administrative staff.71 The 
equipment and building sites of  the factories that had been closed down were 
sold. The revenues increased available working capital, so the company did not 
have to borrow as much in these years. In spite of  this, the index of  external 
financing deteriorated in the second half  of  the 1920s (Diagram 2). The layoffs 
had not brought savings for years either, because severances and pension 
payments represented a large financial burden in the first years.72
Diagram 2: Financial position of  the First Budapest Steam Mill (1914−1942)
Indebtedness coefficient 1: Proportion of  creditors to capital assets
Indebtedness coefficient 2: Proportion of  external capital to own capital 
External capital: Liabilities less own capital 
Own capital: Share capital plus reserves
Creditors: Acceptances in circulation plus not redeemed dividend-warrants
Source: Balance sheets of  the FBSM, 1914−1942. On the index numbers: Béla Tomka, “A magyar 
malomipar finanszírozása,” 79–97.
71  BFL XI.1005. box 2. General assembly of  the year 1926, May 23, 1927. 
72  BFL XI.1005. box 2. General assembly of  the year 1927, February 24, 1928.
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Consequently, the merger did not bring about the expected results. The 
company’s financial situation and competitiveness did not improve. Flour 
exports had diminished further, and revenues and profits kept declining. During 
the Great Depression, the market interventions of  the government, such as the 
boletta system, the subsidies to domestic grain producers, the introduction of  
the foreign exchange control and the overvalued exchange rate of  the pengő 
currency also damaged the competitiveness of  the Hungarian flour mills abroad. 
The profitability of  the company declined dramatically in the years following 
the merger. Except for the years 1927–1928, profits declined year by year. After 
1932, there was hardly a year which did not bring losses (Diagram 3). 
Diagram 3: Profitability of  the First Budapest Steam Mill, 1914−1942 (percent)
Proportion of  profits to share capital 
Source: Balance sheets of  the FBSM, 1914−1942
Reserves kept shrinking as well. As of  late 1927, the shares prices quoted on 
the Budapest Stock Exchange declined steadily and never exceeded face value, 
by the end of  1930 they were worth only a third of  their nominal value (Diagram 
4). Therefore it was decided at the general assembly held on February 21, 1931 
to reduce the share capital of  the company by one third, from 8.4 million to 5.6 
million pengős.73 
73  BFL XI.1005. box 2. Ordinary general assembly of  the year 1930, February 21, 1931. 
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Diagram 4: Share prices of  the First Budapest Steam Mill Co., 1926–1931 (pengő)
Source: Quotations, Pesti Tőzsde, 1926−1931.
The public balance for 1933 showed a loss of  1.5 million pengős and for 1935 
4 million pengős, which was caused partly by the deficits of  the current business 
year and partly by the writing-down of  the value of  the closed and demolished 
mills from the balance sheet. The serious losses and business recession forced 
the management to dismantle many flour mills and sell demolished materials 
and machinery. The real properties were sold as building plots after having been 
parceled out. The flour mill in Vác was also closed down, and dismissals and 
pensioning continued. Demolition of  the Pest Steam Mill of  Millers and Bakers 
on the Soroksári Street began in 1933.74 The Lujza Steam Mill had also shown 
losses for many years. Incomes did not cover the expenditures, so Lujza was 
merged into the FBSM by January 1, 1936. FBSM took over the Lujza’s warehouse 
business and the issue of  the warehouse warrants, which was continued on the 
Óbuda site of  the Erzsébet Mill. The buildings in Újlak, which had not been 
in operation for many years, was also demolished and the building parcels on 
74  BFL XI.1005. box 61, letter of  the Hungarian Minister of  Commerce, 29.367/VI. a.sz./1933. May 
15, 1933.
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Kolosy Square and Lajos Street were sold.75 This was followed in 1939 by the 
dismantling of  the industrial and residential buildings of  the Erzsébet Mill.76
Conclusions
On the basis of  contemporary sources we can conclude that the big Budapest 
commercial mills had a fairly accurate assessment of  their situation. They were 
well aware of  the main causes of  the serious crisis. They also knew the alternatives 
that could have alleviated their problems. In my paper, I showed that Hungarian 
flour mills developed various strategies to improve their competitiveness 
in the middle of  the 1920s. First they attempted to create a looser form of  
cooperation; a plan of  establishing a milling cartel involving a large number of  
flour mills was made. Then the concept of  horizontal integration was tried by 
merging the biggest flour milling firms. Personal conflicts, inability to accept 
the compromises necessary for cooperation, and distrust hindered horizontal 
integration of  the biggest players. Crisis management strategies also failed, 
possibly because there were too many firms in Hungary. It was nearly impossible 
to conclude an agreement due to conflicting interests of  the many flour mills. 
Although the FBSM, as the biggest company of  the branch of  industry, tried 
to play a leading role in transforming the Hungarian milling industry, it proved 
unable to assert leadership over others. As a consequence, neither project was 
implemented in the 1920s, which might explain why the domestic flour milling 
industry proved unable to overcome its problems and remained permanently a 
crisis-ridden branch, which gradually liquidated itself  in the 1930s. In parallel 
with these attempts, some bigger companies formed concerns by drawing 
smaller flour mills into their spheres of  influence in order to reduce price 
wars and competition and also to gain new markets. These mergers, however, 
did not lead to higher profits or better utilization of  capacities, even when 
business administration got centralized and production processes rationalized. 
75  MNL OL Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank Z 36. item 91. Industry Department, 113d/91. t. Lujza 
Steam Mill, minutes of  the ordinary general assembly held in the boardroom of  the First Budapest Steam 
Mill on May 12, 1936; BFL XI. 1005. Record Office, box 75, Documents on the merger of  the Luiza Steam 
Mill into the First Budapest Steam Mill; BFL XI.1005. Record Office, box 75. Letter of  the Luiza Steam 
Mill Company to the Royal Hungarian Tax Office of  Budapest, IIIrd district, Budapest, March 19, 1936, 
BFL XI.1005. box 75. Letter of  the Luiza Steam Mill Company to the mayor of  Budapest capital town Dr. 
Károly Szendy, September 30, 1935. 
76  BFL XI.1005. Technical documents, box 126, file 20. Papers concerning the demolition of  the 
Erzsébet Steam Mill.
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Acquisitions did not prove effective and did not lead to the restoration of  former 
market positions. Insufficient product diversification and shrinking internal and 
exports markets might have contributed to the failure as well.
Finally, in the changing atmosphere of  the 1930s, direct state intervention 
was applied in order to mitigate the crisis. Neither the failed cartels nor the 
mergers, nor even government assistance was enough to stabilize the financial 
positions of  the branch, however, which led to the self-liquidation of  the 
Hungarian flour milling industry. By the 1930s, flour mills which had once been 
the great pride of  Hungarian industry were being shut down and dismantled.
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